Ontological gratitude (and disjunctivism too)

There continues to be an incredibly interesting conversation happening in the comment section of my last post. I want to highlight one aspect of it here. Commenter dmf has identified a tricky and complicated issue about the circumstances under which it is appropriate to feel grateful for having been given a decision. Dmf has also pointed out that this issue is tied to a similar concern that was raised before about ATS. The issues here are subtle and important. Let me see if I can say something about what’s going on.

As I understand it, the issue is something like this. It’s not always obvious that we should be grateful for being given some understanding of ourselves and the world. As dmf writes, “aren’t we often enough so converted to positions that turn out to be un-fortunate to some degree or another?” I agree that this is often enough the case. And it’s worse than that, too. That because, it’s not always clear until *after the fact* whether something that seems to demand your gratitude really is something you should be grateful for. This presents an apparent problem. For suppose that I am given a decision about what commitments to make, or how to understand myself, that turns out to be awful and worth repudiating. And suppose further that it is not clear to me until much later that the decision was repulsive in this way. Isn’t it just wrong to say, in these circumstances, that gratitude is appropriate?

Now, I think the two possibilities in question are both genuine and important. Not every understanding of myself is beneficial or good, in other words, and I might not know about a given understanding that it is un-fortunate in this way until after I have been committed by it. Interesting issues arise from this pair of observations. The issues are, I believe, close to what Bernard Williams once called cases of moral luck. In our instance, however, the phenomena take place in a domain that is a bit broader than that of morality proper. So, let’s start with Williams’ more restricted kind of case.

Remember how it works for Williams. He argues that it is not always clear whether we are culpable for our actions until their effects have been brought about. The drunk driver who kills someone, for instance, turns out to be more morally culpable than the one who – through nothing but sheer luck – doesn’t happen to encounter any other people to run over on his drive home. The first person kills someone through his irresponsibility while the second, though equally irresponsible, has the luck not to have been in circumstances that made it possible for him to kill someone. Even though the second person was equally irresponsible, the first is more culpable.

Now, it is certainly clear that there is a legal distinction here. The law treats the first person differently than the second. The first could easily be found guilty of manslaughter, while the second only of drunk driving. But Williams wants to argue that this legal distinction is tracking a distinction in our understanding of moral culpability as well. That means that whether we are morally culpable or not is determined, in part, by facts about the world instead of entirely by internal facts about ourselves and the decisions we make.

There are other examples, too. Here’s an example that’s clearly in the moral domain, but without a legal counterpart. Williams argues that the artist Gauguin turns out not to have been morally culpable for – indeed to have been morally justified in – leaving his family and moving to Tahiti. That’s because he turned out to make great contributions in the history of art because of this decision. But there was no way Gauguin could have foreseen this outcome when he made the decision to leave. In some sense, therefore, the goodness of his decision is determined by facts not available to him when he made it. Indeed, it is determined in the end by facts that are out of his control altogether. Whether Gauguin was to become a great artist or not was the result not only of his talent and ambition, but of the reception of his work and its place in the social history of art. As in the case of drunk driving, therefore, whether Gauguin’s decision was a good or bad one, whether he was doing a good or bad thing in making it, is in part determined by moral luck.

Now, we don’t have to agree with the particular interpretation of either of these cases that Williams gives to accept his basic claim: certain moral facts about us are not established until after the decision to perform the act in question. Indeed, they may not be established until the consequences of that decision – some of which we have no control over at all – are brought about in the world. Now, it’s worth noticing that in some sense, this is a particular instance of the existentialist idea that who you are is not determined except through the course of time – that for human beings their essence lies in existence. But it is a relatively limited version of this point – limited to the moral quality of certain of our acts. Still, if it is true – and I think that at least something in the area is true – this tells us something important about human temporality as well. It tells us that the moral significance of our actions can sometimes be established retroactively – that the temporality of significant human lives is not strictly linear like that of natural events. Now, what we have in the case of gratitude, I think, is something like an application of this aspect of human temporality. So, let’s try an example in this broader domain.

Suppose that I come at some point to have the experience of being given an understanding of myself as a white supremacist. We can agree, let us assume, that this is a nasty and reprehensible way to be – that it is, therefore, un-fortunate and to be repudiated. But let us suppose also that the repulsiveness of this way of being is not clear to me when the decision to be this way is given. What is the sense, then, in which it is appropriate, if it is, to be grateful for having been given such an understanding of myself and the world?

There are a few things to say about this example. First, let’s talk about the content of the decision. The natural and immediate thing to say is that it is not appropriate to be grateful for having been given this understanding of yourself. Insofar as the view is reprehensible, it is not a good thing to become associated with it, and therefore we should not be grateful for the development. But the connection is not so straightforward, I think. Consider the following.

Some Christians seem to believe that we have to get worse in order to become better. This is a constant strain in figures like Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, for instance, and it is grounded in a certain reading of the New Testament. You might think, for example, that it was not an accident that the apostle Paul was a persecutor of the Christians before his conversion to Christianity. Indeed, on one reading of the story, he *had* to dive deeply into this sinful life in order to get the gestalt flip of the conversion experience. If we are to take this kind of trajectory seriously, therefore, it could turn out to have been a good thing to have been given, and to live out, the reprehensible, white-supremacist understanding of myself. It would turn out to have been a good thing just in case having understood myself in that way turns out to be a pre-requisite to my being flipped out of that understanding and into something genuinely good. In that case, I could be grateful for having been given such an understanding of myself.

Now, as it happens, I think that there really are cases in which a person’s existence has this kind of trajectory. I think it does sometimes happen, in other words, that by getting worse we get better. Grief is a good example. We only emerge from grief in a healthy way by facing up to and undergoing the pain and suffering of the loss of a loved one. The Christian view I am thinking about just makes this phenomenon much more pervasive. Still, it really is something that happens. In this way I think the Christians really have identified (or better yet, have made possible) a certain way to be. I do not think, however, that *only* by getting worse we get better. This is one of the many things that distinguishes my view from that of the Christians. I don’t think, in other words, that it is a *necessary* fact of human existence that we need to “awake in the middle of a dark wood” and go down to the bottom of hell before we are ready to climb the mountain of purgatory and be transported up to the realm of paradise. Still, I do agree that it is one of the ways human beings can be. And after all, how could I not agree with this? There is ample evidence from the history of Christianity and its various interpretations that some people really are this way. Furthermore, living at the far end of the history of this way of being, it seems to me that it is available as a way to be for many of us now as well – whether we are believing Christians or not. As a result, it could turn out, even about the *content* of my imagined white supremacist identity, that it would be appropriate for me to be grateful for having been given it. It would be appropriate, that is, just in case it turns out that it was a pre-requisite to my “salvation.”

This brings us to an interesting fact about the gratitude for given-ness that I have been talking about – what I will call its “disjunctivist” structure. To understand this, we must ask a question. Granted that it may become clear to me after the fact that my gratitude was appropriate. But how are we to understand my gratitude *at the moment* I come to have this (repulsive) understanding of myself? Let’s see.

Suppose that I have just been given the (repulsive) understanding of myself as a white supremacist. It grounds my commitments and allows me the resources for sticking to them. I go forth into my white supremacist world. And I feel grateful for having been given this understanding of myself. But is it real, genuine gratitude that I am experiencing? Well, as we have seen, that depends upon what possibilities it later makes possible. If it makes possible my turn away from such an understanding, if it is the darkness that I needed to descend into in order to see the light, then yes it was appropriate for me to be grateful for it at the time. True, my gratitude was in some sense or another wrongly understood – I thought I was being grateful for being a white supremacist when really I was being grateful for being a white-supremacist as a condition for later becoming something good. But it is nevertheless genuine gratitude that I am experiencing. On the other hand, if my current self-understanding doesn’t make possible that later transformation, if I stay in my identity as white supremacist and make repugnant contributions to the world on the basis of it for the rest of my life, then the opposite is true. My life will not have been a success, and my gratitude will have been blinkered. It will be the embodiment of a deep and abiding misunderstanding of what the world demands of me.

Philosophers might call this a “disjunctivist” account of the condition of gratitude because although, from within, the two cases look identical, these inner facts only establish that I am in one *or another* of the relevant conditions. They establish a disjunct – hence “disjunctivism.” In fact, the two conditions in question couldn’t be more different – one really is appropriate and genuine gratitude for a transition that is, as a contingent matter of fact, a pre-requisite for my salvation, while the other is only apparent gratitude for a transition that actually establishes the repulsiveness of my existence. The inner experience on its own, therefore, is disjunctive – it only indicates that it is one *or the other* of these states that I am in. The world has to continue – my existence needs to play itself out – in order for it to be determined which condition I was actually in. Once it is established, of course, it will retroactively always have been true that it was that way. Another version of the weird temporality of human existence.

In any case, this is all to say that I can imagine circumstances in which I could appropriately be grateful for being given an understanding of myself that is, as a matter of fact, repulsive. But the circumstances require that that understanding turn out to be a pre-requisite for a further transformation. In the bad case, when the circumstances do not turn out to have made this transition something worth being grateful for, I might feel exactly the same way – as if I am grateful for being given this experience of myself. But in fact, I am not grateful, since it makes no sense to be grateful that some unmitigatedly bad thing has happened to me.

So that is the first thing to talk about – gratitude for the particular content of what has been given. I might always *feel* grateful when that kind of clarity is given – indeed, it might be appropriate for me always to *feel* grateful in that kind of circumstance. But whether I actually *am* grateful is determined by how things end up turning out.

All that said, though, this is not the main thing that I am usually thinking about when I say that the experience of being given a decision demands gratitude. That brings us to the second thing I want to say about this kind of case. It is that the gratitude I am really aiming at here happens, so to speak, at a different level than the one we have been talking about so far. It is gratitude not for having been given this particular understanding of myself and the world, an understand with this content or another. It is, instead, gratitude for being the kind of being capable of being given an understanding of myself and the world at all. We could call it, I would like to call it, ontological gratitude.

Now, gratitude for being the kind of being I am, it seems to me, is appropriate if it turns out that we are right to prefer it to not being that way. If it is better to be open to being given an understanding of oneself than to be closed off to it, in other words, then evidence of our being this kind of openness at all demands our gratitude. The natural question, then, is this: Why should we prefer to be a standing openness than to be closed off to what is given? Or to ask the same question in other terms: Why should we be grateful for the kind of given-ness that this kind of openness allows?

These are complicated questions, and I cannot go into them in detail here. But I can make this observation. Lives of significance, it seems to me, depend upon our being open to what is given. Our lives do not come to have the meaning they do because we *decide* that is the meaning they will have. We are not capable of bringing about the significance of our lives through anything we manage to do or say. Or so I claim. Now, this is a controversial view. It is opposed by people as different from one another as John Rawls and Jean-Paul Sartre. It is one of the aims of my book to justify myself against figures like this, and I can’t really hope to do that here. Still, if what I am saying is true – if to be human at all requires being a standing openness to what is given – then to be closed off in the relevant way is for it not to be possible to live a human life at all. Now it is true, of course, that not every significant, human life – not every life that has some meaning or another to it – is a *good* life. But having no meaning at all in your life, it seems to me, is not to be living a human life in the first place.

Here is where I still maintain hope. We could call it ontological hope – hope about the kind of being we are. For I believe that it is still possible for us to live lives of meaning and worth, that it is possible for us, in other words, to bring about significant and meaningful changes in the world that speak to others and ourselves, changes that allow us to bring one another out better, to “accomplish” ourselves and the world. I don’t think there is a single notion of what is best or most fulfilling for us – I am a pretty radical pluralist in this regard. But I do believe that some ways of being are better than others, and some ways of being human are just awful. And I believe, therefore, that we can commit ourselves to making our lives and the lives of others better in myriad ways. It is possible for us to do this, in small things as well as in large, in community with others and in the stand we take on ourselves. But in each case, it happens only on the basis of our already having taken some understanding of ourselves and the world as given. The fact that this is possible, therefore, seems to me heartily worth celebrating.

The basic issue, therefore, is this. The world is capable of being significant, and therefore of being significantly better than it is, in part because of the kind of being we are. Because of this, the very fact of our being that kind of being, it seems to me, demands our gratitude. Without our kind of being, one of the founding conditions for significance would be absent. And significance is constitutively tied up with the possibility of significant improvement of some sort or another. It is because we stand as one of the constituting factors for this kind of condition, that we should be grateful whenever we are given some new understanding of ourselves and the world. Not because of the content of that understanding – which may turn out to be repulsive and may, in fact, turn out not to deserve our gratitude at all. But because of this higher level fact: its having been given to us establishes the possibility of significance and significant improvement. Because it re-affirms the fact that we can be involved in the betterment of the world.

That is ontological gratitude: gratitude for our being the being we are. And that kind of gratitude, I believe, really is demanded in every experience of being given a decision at all.

 

About Sean D. Kelly

Sean Dorrance Kelly is the Teresa G. and Ferdinand F. Martignetti Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. He is also Faculty Dean at Dunster House, one of the twelve undergraduate Houses at Harvard. He served for six years as chair of Harvard's Department of Philosophy. Kelly earned an Sc.B. in Mathematics and Computer Science and an M.S. in Cognitive and Linguistic Sciences from Brown University in 1989. After three years as a Ph.D. student in Logic and Methodology of Science, he received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of California at Berkeley in 1998. Before arriving at Harvard in 2006, Kelly taught at Stanford and Princeton, and he was a Visiting Professor at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris. Sean Kelly's work focuses on various aspects of the philosophical, phenomenological, and cognitive neuroscientific nature of human experience. He is a world authority on 20th century European Philosophy, specializing in the work of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. He has also done influential work in philosophy of mind and philosophy of perception. Kelly has published articles in numerous journals and anthologies and he has received fellowships or awards from the Guggenheim Foundation, the NEH, the NSF and the James S. McDonnell Foundation, among others. Fun fact: He appeared on The Colbert Show in 2011 to talk about All Things Shining. Sean Kelly lives at Dunster House with his wife, the Harvard Philosopher Cheryl Kelly Chen, and their two boys, Benjamin and Nathaniel.
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15 Responses to Ontological gratitude (and disjunctivism too)

  1. dmf says:

    thanks for this will give it more time soon, just a note to tag this ” It will be the embodiment of a deep and abiding misunderstanding of what the world demands of me” (what is the world and how does it demand, and how do we come to establish such matters, etc?) as needing more explication and to leave the question not so much is it better to be open or closed but to ask is openness a skill to be cultivated (and if so how) or just an accidental characteristic (and or meeting of inherent trait and environment)?
    back to the grind, dirk

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  3. dmf says:

    I left this reply over @ TB’s blog linked in his pinback here.
    “Obviously we need to hold firm to some things, but such tenacity is relative, as we remain open to future experiences and to future transformations of our understanding”
    in his correct critique of Rorty’s prescription of an ironic stance St.Fish pointed out that no matter how sophisticated our sense of historicity/contingency/etc that we cannot choose to not believe, or somehow hold lightly, what we currently hold (are held by?) to be true/right, but we surely we might somehow be part of (or assemble) organizations and procedures that put some checks and balances in place to keep our current prejudices from becoming tyrannical, perhaps like Isabelle Stengers’ plea for a “slow” science, as to the problematic use of true by Sean I think that Andy Pickering’s shift from thinking/acting in terms of representation to performativity* is a potentially helpful corrective.
    Steven Shaviro noted “Isabelle Stengers has taught us, in the course of her reading of Whitehead, that the construction of metaphysical concepts always addresses certain particular, situated needs. The concepts that a philosopher produces depend upon the problems to which he or she is responding. Every thinker is motivated by the difficulties that cry out to him or to her, demanding a response. A philosophy therefore defines itself by the nature of its accomplishments, by what it is able to disclose, produce, or achieve. ”
    *https://architecture.mit.edu/sites/architecture.mit.edu/files/attachments/lecture/nss130067-pub.pdf

    • Matthew says:

      I have no problem with Sean’s use of true. I suspect it will lead in the direction of thinking the truth of one’s stand, of the clearing and of being. This kind of truth surely does involve the fidelity that Terence sees as a diminution of truth and that I see as generic.

      Linking to the gift and at risk, for want of time, of just paraphrasing Thinking involves thanking. Thankfulness for the gift not only of being but, in the case of a decision, for a resolution of some temporal tension or parallax set up between the thing (writing) and the world (the shattered shoulder, the loss of Bert as Virgil).

      • terenceblake says:

        Frankly, I don’t think thinking has anything to do with thanking, most of the time. Heidegger had an overly sacralising approach to the German language, where denken (thinking) and danken (thanking) are so close. Similarly, Bernard Stiegler draws on his native French and the identity in pronunciation between “penser” (to think) and “panser” (to dress a wound, to tend to, but also more generally to take care of, to attend to), and tells us that “penser” is “panser”, to think is to take care of, to care for, to pay careful attention to. Despite the danger of word magic from the reification of the specificities of one’s language, I am much more in accordance with Stiegler’s idea, which is more generic in that thanking is one way of attending to.

        I don’t see fidelity as a “diminution” of truth, but rather as a weakening of the connotation of certainty that may be associated with the term if we take it cognitively.

  4. dmf says:

    Trump’s wannabe Rasputin Steve Bannon has his own story of salvation/calling as he was caught up in the glamours of Wall Street and then Hollywood until the malfeasance of his fellow financial svengalis and pirates bankrupted the life’s-work of his salt of the earth blue-collar and pious Catholic dad and then he withdrew into the world of ideas, renounced his old ways/passions, and came out a resolute organizer of fellow defenders of the faith and now hobnobs with high-ups in the Vatican and other world leaders for the righteous cause of saving Culture and Civilization from the forces of Darkness and sin.
    Is there some direction (some measure or Logos) to history/world that we can check the veritas of such claims against? i think not but would welcome anyone pointing to them if they exist, I think as Rorty and others have that we have only our own contingent interests (evolving as we have noted as they are) to measure such matters against, we are as Derrida and others have pointed out
    un-grounded in such matters, Wittgenstein noted that at some point in giving after the fact justifications for one’s stances one can only say this is where my spade (of interrogation) hits bedrock….
    just to pin this footnote from Levin here as something perhaps relevant to the larger project-ion here
    https://focusing.org/apm-papers/levin

  5. Pingback: LOOKING A « GIFT  THOUGHT IN THE OTHER: on etymology, genericity, and thinking | «AGENT SWARM

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  7. Michael S. Pearl says:

    Just a few quick, preliminary thoughts.: “Given” in the foregoing, often (if not always) seems replaceable by “possible”. For instance, “Lives of significance … depend upon our being open to what is given” can be understood as “Lives of significance … depend upon our being open to what is possible.” This would be to say that what is given are the alternative possibilities which constitute (and restrict) the given context. This would also be to say that some metaphysical indeterminateness is hypothesized. That indeterminateness serves as a basis for alternatives but also for a way of being/living that is open to alternatives. While an appreciation of the indeterminateness which itself could make possible a way of being/living that is open to alternatives might well lead to occasions of gratitude, the more apt initial focus/emphasis then seems to be on the opening to alternatives in a given context rather than on gratitude.

    • terenceblake says:

      Hello Michael, I agree that there is a hesitation between gratitude for an “unshakeable and true” understanding that is given and gratitude for the possibility of transformation of understanding, that new possibilities may emerge. I am tempted to call the first type “Kuhnian” gratitude and the second type “Popperian” gratitude. In the case of Popperian gratitude I also agree that “gratitude” is not the best word, and that words like “attention” or “openness” are more appropriate. A related distinction would be that between the dogmatic attitude, which presupposes determinateness, and the pluralist attitude (which presupposes both under-determination and indeterminateness).

      • Michael S. Pearl says:

        Hello again, Terence. I have the impression that “gratitude” is intended to invoke or introduce a possibly somewhat common experiential aspect which openness in itself likely does not suggest. That aspect would be an experience which might be described in terms of being overwhelmed or being in awe (to put forth just a couple of descriptions). And what the sense of being overwhelmed or being in awe highlight or point to is the concomitant sense of being overwhelmed/awed by or because of something seemingly external to – and wholly independent of – the person experiencing the awe. Sometimes such an overwhelming awe might be experienced as – and described in terms of – being fearsome, but, then, it may well be openness that makes possible the aptness of the response in terms of gratitude.

        I expect it is apparent that the awesome/awe-inducing experience experienced as being because of or in response to something seemingly external and independent is a basis for the notion of something transcendent. Sean’s explication in terms of a demanded gratitude may well be almost reflexively taken (by some) as invoking or depending upon an actual metaphysically transcendent domain. Yet, such a reflex itself might miss some important points.

        Similar to Sean’s demanded gratitude, Arendt, in “What is Authority?”, discusses authority in terms of demanded obedience: “authority always demands obedience.” However, the authority which demands obedience “precludes the use of external means of coercion” and is “incompatible with persuasion”. What kind of demand is that?! Arendt locates authority in an hierarchical order where “[t]he authoritarian relation between the one who commands and the one who obeys rests neither on common reason nor on the power of the one who commands; what they have in common is the hierarchy itself, whose rightness and legitimacy both recognize and where both have their predetermined stable place.”

        This demanded obedience, in effect, refers to a demand without a demander (and the parallel to the gift without a giver should be apparent) even if there is a commander who expresses the demand, a demand which is otherwise necessarily independent of the commander if the demand is an instance of authority. But what Arendt does not explain is what would make “demand” the correct term to use in association with the authority and obedience at issue. Even so, if the demand is appreciated as depicting the internal reaction to a person’s sense of rightness, then “demand” is an appropriate way of describing the experience of ever being overwhelmed by rightness – a rightness which is, once again, sensed as ultimately external to and independent of the experiencing person.

        Despite her efforts to avoid the possibility of transcendence, with her dependence on (there being a sense of) rightness, Arendt has not eliminated the possibility of something transcendent.

        While I have no trouble understanding (the origins of) allergies to the notion of some metaphysically transcendent domain, given some indeterminateness (and “under-determination”), whether there is a transcendent or not is a matter which effectively evaporates when the focus is set upon what sort of rightness we act to make manifest (within the immanent). It is possible that rightness could be to some extent dependent upon something in some sense transcendent without that transcendent serving as or entailing the foundation for a fully (also meaning eternally) determinate rightness, a rightness devoid of indeterminateness and under-determination – which is why the manifestation of an always as yet indeterminate and under-determined (in a sense, infinite) rightness is more the concern than any possible transcendent itself.

  8. bV says:

    Hello Sean (and others),

    I really liked the piece, esp. the dual aspect of gratitude and the human temporality notion. I’ll try to come back to those. But I also have a few questions.

    On the first, let’s say non-ontological, part:
    What is good? What is it grounded on, if on anything? Seems that, as dmf pointed out, the world and its demands need to be clarified too (“It will be the embodiment of a deep and abiding misunderstanding of what the world demands of me.”)
    Relatedly: “[O]nly apparent gratitude for a transition that actually establishes the repulsiveness of my existence”; repulsiveness to whom?

    Secondly, how do a white supremacist’s actions of love (widely construed) for something not excluded by his racism (people of his race, or whales, or works of art, or trees or, maybe more subtly, even not being WS enough to not save some non-white people from a house fire whereas being WS enough to curse at them while riding the bus) fit in? Is there a singular affect of gratitude for each individual action? Is there a gratitude equilibrium at any given moment and/or a final one on death? How do you think about these things on this finite human temporality level?

    Lastly, considering this fact-based moral luck notion in a strict manner, could the contingently positive (“good”) results of the WS’s moral actions turn him into a “good” person? (In a Mark Twain satire kind of way.) I guess this is the “good” question from a different perspective.

    As to the second, let’s say ontological, part, first I wonder if embodiment, or whatever you’d like to call the specifically human experience of having a body, is at play in your account of gratitude etc., given that you are interested in writing about what it is to be human today.

    Also: how is it possible to not have any meaning at all in your life? How do you mean that? (“But having no meaning at all in your life, it seems to me, is not to be living a human life in the first place.”)

    Cheers

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